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PHILIP J.KAIN
The Structure and Method of Hegel's
Phenomenology
H. S. Harris is one of the great Hegel scholars of our era.
I want to present a view different from his of how Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit is organized, what it is tr5ring to do,
and where it is trying to go. I hope my disagreements with
Professor Harris will succeed in being dialectical, that is,
that they will give rise to contradiction that allows for the
generation of further insight.
The proclaimed task of the Phenomenology is to educate,
train, or culture ordinary consciousness, to raise it to the
level of what Hegel calls "science"—or true knowledge.^  The
Phenomenology is a movement from the simplest form of
knowledge, sense knowledge, all the way to absolute
knowing, that is, total, all-encompassing knowledge. '
At this point it is impossible to define the Absolute. We
can, hqwever, say that absolute knowing is taken to be
absolute in several senses: (1) It grasps absolutely all
reality. Like the traditional God, it is total. There is no
reality except what is present to absolute consciousness, no
thing-in-itself left outside, nothing at all outside.^ (2) It is
absolutely true, not just in the sense that it involves no
mistakes, errors, or illusions, but in the older sense of true
1. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1977), 3, 15-16, 50 (hereafter PhS in the text).
2. I do not wish to suggest that the Absolute is a transcendent, onto-theological
reality. I view it as a cultural construction—a view, however, that I will have to
develop elsewhere.
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as when one speaks of a "true friend," one who lives up to
the concept, the ideal, the essence, of friendship.^ The
Absolute is truth fully realized—the highest truth. There is
nothing higher. (3) It is also absolutely present, accessible,
and open to consciousness, not merely implicit or in poten-
tial. It has been actualized and fully manifested in appear-
ance. (4) It is also absolute freedom. It is not other to me,
outside, an obstacle. It is not heteronomous. I am fully at
home with it. It is absolutely mine—my very identity.
The Phenomenology, as it proceeds, sets out different
forms of consciousness for our examination and moves
ordinary consciousness along until it finally reaches and
accepts the Absolute. We have full actuality only when we
get to the Absolute. Short of that, something is missing.
Hegel holds a doctrine of internal relations. "Everything
that exists stands in a relationship, and this relationship is
what is genuine in every existence" (EL, 204, also 193-94).*
To adequately understand anything—its essence—^we must
understand its relationship to other things, the whole, the
Absolute. The central argument of the Phenomenology is
that we will not be able to adequately explain the simplest
form of consciousness without being driven to bring in more
and more complex forms of consciousness, and ultimately
that we will be forced all the way to the Absolute.
Only the Absolute provides an adequate conceptual
scheme. Each stage of the Phenomenology, we discover,
lacks something. To handle what is missing will require a
more complex and inclusive conceptual scheme that will
include all that the earlier scheme did plus what it could
not. In this way we uncover the presuppositions necessary
to explain our experience. And to do so adequately, Hegel
thinks, ultimately requires a paradigm that will include all
reality.
Hegel starts with the most basic awareness, awareness of
simple sensation. From there he moves step by step through
ever more complex forms of experience. He watches each as
it tries to give an adequate account of its self-sufficiency.
Each and every one fails to do so, and we must move on to a
3. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, H. S.
Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), 59-60, 287-88 (hereafter SL).
4. See also Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities P, 1989), 86 (hereafter SL).
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more complex form of consciousness. If any earlier form of
consciousness were actually able to justify itself as self-
sufficient, then Hegel's project would fail. We would need go
no further. We would have a philosophical account of
experience that did not require the Absolute. But, for Hegel,
each earlier stage does fail and we must move on until we
reach the Absolute; only it will be able to justify itself
In the Science of Logic, Hegel claims that the Phenomenol-
ogy gives us a justification {Rechtfertigung), a deduction
{Deduction), of the existence of the Absolute. What Hegel is
saying here, I think, is that the mode of argument that the
Phenomenology uses to establish the Absolute is the same
sort of argument that Kant called a transcendental deduc-
tion {Deduction), and which Kant used to establish the
legitimacy {Rechtmässigkeit) of the categories {SL, 48-49).^
For Kant, we have ordered experience—that is something
that it is simply impossible to deny. His transcendental
deduction proceeded, then, by asking how we have this
experience; we seek the transcendental conditions that make
this ordered experience possible. The categories of the
understanding, Kant thinks, are those conditions. If we can
show, then, that the only possible way to have ordered ex-
perience is through the categories of the understanding,
then we have given a deduction of the categories, justified
them, proven them {CPR, B126-A94, A97, A125, B161). This
is what Hegel is doing in the Phenomenology. We begin by
setting out our experience, though we end up setting out far
more complex forms of experience than Kant attended to.
As we set out these forms of experience, we try to explain
how it is possible to have them, we seek the conditions that
make this experience possible, we seek to justify it, and ulti-
mately we are led all the way to the Absolute. Anything
short of that will fail to account for the total range of our
experience.
How can one set about proving the existence of the
Absolute? How can one prove a first principle? One cer-
tainly cannot deduce it by logically deriving it from other
5. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B116-A85 (hereafter CPR); I
have used the Norman Kemp Smith translation (New York: St. Martin's P, 1965)
but cite the standard A and B edition pagination.
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principles (SL, 530).^  If one thinks the existence of the
Absolute is buried in the premises one starts with, and one
tries to draw the Absolute out of them, logically deduce it,
one can succeed in proving the Absolute only if the starting
premises have been proven. But if they are starting pre-
mises they obviously have not been proven. To prove them,
the starting premises would have to be derived from other
premises, and those in their turn from others, and so on ad
infmitum. One would have an unproven and unprovable
starting point—as Fichte thinks we must.^ If there were
some other way to establish the necessity of a starting point,
find some sort of Cartesian, indubitable, Archimedian point,
then we would have to consider such an approach. But, as
we shall see in "Sense-Certainty," Hegel does not seem to
start in this way. He does not start off with something
undeniable and indubitable. In fact, he almost instantly
finds sense-certainty quite deniable and doubtable, as he
does every other stage until the Absolute. Moreover, the
Phenomenology just does not proceed by laying down and
establishing true propositions from which we go on to
logically deduce further true propositions. Nor does Hegel
even proceed as Fichte did, by laying down a fundamental
principle and then showing it to be impossible unless we
presuppose further conditions (SKW, 25). It is not even a
"progressive discovery oí truth," as Harris has it.^ Instead,
for Hegel, at every stage we find that our account will not
hold, that it is somehow inadequate, incomplete, false at
least in certain respects, and that we must go on to more
6. Some scholars do seem to think that the Absolute is logically deduced; see
Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. James H. Nichols,
Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 82. Also, Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and
Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John
Heckman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1974), 157. Richard Norman, Hegel's
Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction (New York: St. Martin's P, 1976),
117-18.
7. Johann Fichte, Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre), trans. Peter
Heath and John Lachs (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofls, 1970), 12, 24
(hereafter SKW). Also Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's
System of Philosophy, trans. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany, NY: SUNY P,
1977), 103,105. See also W. T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel (New York: Dover,
1955), 89-115.
8. H. S. Harris, Hegel: Phenomenology and System (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1995), 19 (hereafter HP&S).
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complex presuppositions, until we finally reach the Absolute.
The Phenomenology is a "pathway of doubt," a "way of
despair," a "thoroughgoing scepticism" (PhS, 49-50).
Like Kant, Hegel starts out from experience. We cannot
deny that we experience a tree, a white cube of salt, a force,
and so forth. Hegel certainly does not think that there is
nothing to question and no room for deception in such
experience— i^n fact, he very obviously thinks there is a great
deal of deception and a lot to question. We may even have
it completely wrong. In any experience, then, there is
something that demands explanation, something we must
try to understand. So Hegel sets these experiences out from
the simplest to the most complex and examines traditional
attempts to understand and explain them. Each explana-
tion fails. In this way, Hegel's approach is a negative one.
Thus, unlike Fichte, he does not have the burden of justify-
ing any principle, position, or theory; he does not have to
give us, or defend, his own explanation—until the very end
when he arrives at the Absolute. His method for proving the
reality of the Absolute, then, is to keep setting out more and
more complex forms of experience that demand explanation,
and to demolish any explanations of this experience that are
simpler than the Absolute—thus to show us that this
Absolute is the only explanation of our experience.
As long as we can point to something that counts as
experience, we can ask what makes that experience possible
and seek the conditions necessary for its possibility. We
must account for every experience that can be brought up
and we must give the conceptual presuppositions sufficient
to explain the possibility of that experience. Each stage
fails, but not in every sense. Along the way, we accumulate
a good deal of explanation—or potential explanation. It is
just that experience has not been explained completely. We
finally need a paradigm with enough scope to include
everything, take it all up, niake it a part of a whole, and
leave nothing out. Hegel's approach is a bit like Plato's.
One cannot logically deduce the Forms; instead we use
dialectic. We seek the necessary presuppositions for any
type of knowledge. We move backward through these
presuppositions until we reach the Forms.^ This is crucially
9. Republic, 509d-516c.
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important because many readers assume that the Phenom-
enology proceeds by necessary logical deduction, that each
successive stage is logically derived from what precedes.
Kojève (82) and Hyppolite (157) hold such views. So do
Stace (54, 308-9) and Norman (16), but then they find that
such logical necessity fails, or seems arbitrary or obscure.
Readers notoriously are unable to see the necessity in
moving from one form of consciousness to the next. This
perplexity arises from mistakenly assuming that each stage
is supposed to be logically derived from the preceding.
Other commentators give up on logical deduction and try
to find different forms of necessity in the movement from
one stage to the next. Harris suggests that each stage
"generates a new 'shape,'" yet that the "transition is
necessary." It is "actually a logical result" in the sense that
it is "the answer to the problem that emerged as critically
important in our lives when we were living within the
earUer categorical framework" {HP&S, 18-19, 34-35).^ ° For
Georg Lukács, the necessity is dialectical—each stage
resolves contradictions found on a lower level. For Judith
Butler, it is desire which drives the Hegelian subject on
toward the Absolute. We might argue that the necessity is
presuppositional; the Phenomenology sets out the presuppo-
sitions necessary to explain our experience. Donald Phillip
Verene admits that one stage is not logically deduced from
another, but thinks there is still necessity to be found in the
Phenomenology; he argues that we move from one stage to
the next by ingenuity and wit, by Hegel acting behind the
scenes as a stage hand." Verene is quite correct about how
the Phenomenology moves from one stage to the next, but
how this involves necessity, and what sort of necessity it is,
he does not make clear. I also have no trouble with dialectic
or desire. For Hegel, all we need do is present reason with
something that it does not know and reason will be driven
to grasp it, encompass it, and will never be satisfied short of
totality. In fact, a claim for totality can be found at every
10. Also, see Harris, Hegel's Ladder, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), The
Pilgrimage of Reason I: 67, 263 (hereafter HL).
11. Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London:
Merlin, 1975), 188. Judith P. Butler, Subjects of Desire (New York: Columbia UP,
1987). Donald Phillip Verene, Hegel's Recollection (Albany, NY: SUNY P, 1985),
20-22, 64, 67.
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stage of the Phenomenology. Each form of consciousness
implies that it will give us all knowledge that is possible,
significant, or meaningful. All else is impossible or unim-
portant. Ordinary consciousness comes on the stage quite
sure of itself, unaware of any problems, feels that it knows
all there is to know, and naively thinks it can explain it all
perfectly well without anything so elaborate as the Absolute
being necessary. When it fails, another form of conscious-
ness will rush in to show that it can do better. We do have
some sort of necessity here—something that will keep us
moving on toward the Absolute, something that generates a
new shape or gives us an answer to an earlier problem.
Moreover, I myself have already argued that the Phenomen-
ology tries to get at the presuppositions necessary to explain
our experience. But the fact that we are driven to go on to
another stage after each stage fails, or the fact that later
stages resolve contradictions or problems in earlier stages,
even the fact that later stages give us the presuppositions
necessary for the possibility of experience described at
earlier stages, none of this logically deduces the next stage,
none of this tells us ahead of time what we must move on to,
none of this gives us ahead of time the specific details of
what the next stage must look like. Hegel himself admits
that the movement from stage to stage is presented to
consciousness without it understanding how it happened—it
proceeds behind the back of consciousness (PhS, 56).
Moreover, whatever sort of necessity might be involved in
desire, dialectic, or the generation of new shapes which keep
us moving on toward the Absolute, it certainly could not be
taken to prove the existence of this Absolute. Desire, dia-
lectic, consciousness in general lead on to a lot of things in
the course of the Phenomenology. None hold up for very long.
Even if we admit that desire, dialectic, or whatever, leads us
to the Absolute, is that going to make us accept the exis-
tence of this monster? If logical deduction is ruled out, to
have a proof we need a transcendental deduction; we must
show that without the Absolute we cannot have the sort of
experience we do have. We must show that the Absolute is
a necessary presupposition of our experience. Presup-
positional necessity, then, is fundaniental in the Phenomen-
ology—^without it we would have no proof of the Absolute.
What else do we need, then, to understand the sort of
necessity that moves us from stage to stage in the Phenom-
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enology? Frithjof H. Bergmann draws our attention to an
important form of necessity that we find in Hegel, namely,
necessity for a purpose—necessity in order to reach a goal.^ ^
We might call this strategic necessity. If we want to get to
X, then it is necessary to discover the steps that can get us
there. If we want to reach the Absolute, it is necessary to
find our way through such and such stages. If we are to give
a transcendental deduction of the Absolute, it is necessary
to uncover the conceptual presuppositions needed to explain
experience. If we are to explain the sort of necessity found
between stages in the Phenomenology, we cannot ignore
strategic necessity. Once we get to the Absolute, we can
look back and see that the steps that got us there were
necessary. We would not have gotten there if we had taken
a wrong turn, left out this or that crucial step, or ignored
religion, or culture, and so forth. This necessity, completely
unlike logical deduction, tells us nothing ahead of time
about the details of what the next stage must be.
What is needed is to show that each stage fails. But
nothing specific necessarily follows from that fail-
ure—certainly the next stage is not logically deduced. As
each stage fails, we simply take up another form of con-
sciousness. We look for more complex presuppositions that
can include the accomplishments of the earlier stages and
overcome their failures. It is we who make the leap to the
next stage in order to overcome the inadequacies of the
preceding stages. We are constructing a deduction in the
Kantian sense. We try to dig out the presuppositions
necessary to explain experience. There is no problem with
transitions from stage to stage. Hegel strategically thinks
up the next stage himself. Hegel selects the example he
thinks will work best to make his point. Hegel selects the
sort of experience that will lead us to realize that more
complex conceptual presuppositions are necessary. Hegel
selects what examples he wants so long as things are
arranged to lead us to see that the Absolute is ultimately
necessary to coherently account for all our experience.
Stephen Houlgate claims that the method of the Phenom-
enology does not depend at all upon strategic assumptions
made by Hegel. Hegel need assume nothing. All he need do
12. Frithjof H. Bergmann, "The Purpose of Hegel's System," Journal of the
History of Philosophy 2 (1964): 189-204, esp. 191.
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is attend to the ways in which the various forms of con-
sciousness criticize and transform themselves—Hegel
simply looks on as they call themselves into question.^^
These metaphors do capture something about the experience
of reading Hegel—one category or form of consciousness just
seems to transform itself into another on its own. Harris
speaks of their evolution or generation (HP&S, 18, HL,
1:184-85). But to take these metaphors literally, or even to
take them very far, will reify thought. They already make
Hegel a passive onlooker and his thought something that
merely happens to him. They cloak Hegel's very real
strategic activity. Hegel definitely decides a great many
things himself. He decides in what order to take things up.
He decides what examples of consciousness will best lead
toward the presuppositions he thinks we must make:
fighting and lordship and bondage rather than love to get us
to self-consciousness. Most of the examples he takes up
could have been different. To get where he wanted to go, he
could have chosen other examples than Stoicism, Unhappy
Consciousness, Physiognomy, Antigone, and so forth.
Moreover, Hegel interprets each stage in terms of concrete
literary or historical examples and picks out the specific
problems he wants to focus on. The abstract stages them-
selves do not show us every problem they can or do have.
Hegel strategically selects examples to lead us toward the
Absolute.
Yet each stage fails on its own—in the sense that we do
not need to import an external criterion of truth (PhS, 53-
54). We do not judge each stage against a norm of absolute
truth that Hegel brings onto the scene to show us what has
gone wrong. That would be to presuppose this norm—
ultimately it would be to merely presuppose the Absolute.
We must prove the existence of the Absolute—^we must show
it to be a necessary presupposition. In each stage, Hegel
takes up a more complex and encompassing conceptual
scheme pr set of presuppositions in order to explain experi-
ence, and each time the explanation will fail on its own
terms. Something will not fit, something will be left out,
something will be unexplained. Only the Absolute will
finally succeed.
13. Stephen Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel's
Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1991), 71.
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In a single article, I cannot trace the details of Hegel's
deduction throughout the entire Phenomenology. So I will
just attend to the first three chapters and give a reading of
them that is different fi-om Harris's (HL, I: 208-315).^ ^ In my
view, in each and every one of these chapters—"Sense-
Certainty," "Perception," and "Force and the Understand-
ing"—Kant is at the conceptual center of the issues treated.
These three chapters, I argue, begin Hegel's deduction and
closely follow Kant's transcendental deduction, especially as
Kant laid it out in the A edition of the Critique of Pure
Reason (CPR, A95-A130).
Kant says, "If each representation were completely foreign
to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as
knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is [essentially]
a whole in which representations stand compared and
connected." (CPR, A97)." Coherent experience, Kant argues
in the A edition, requires a threefold synthesis: a synthesis
of apprehension in intuition, a synthesis of reproduction in
imagination, and a synthesis of recognition in a concept.
These are not three separate steps; they are inseparable
moments of one synthesis (CPR, A102, A120-A121). For
knowledge to be possible, the manifold of sensation must be
run through and held together. In the synthesis of appre-
hension, for Kant, the imagination takes up impressions,
apprehends them, forms them into an image, and makes
them modifications of the mind belonging to inner sense and
thus subject to time. For Kant, inner intuition or inner
sense is thoroughgoingly temporal. Our representations
appear to us successively in time. They are ordered,
connected, and related in time (CPR, A98-A100, A120).
This synthesis of apprehension, however, cannot by itself
give us ordered experience. A second synthesis is necessary.
The mind must reinstate preceding perceptions alongside
subsequent perceptions and hold them together in a tempo-
ral series. We need to retain, remember, and reproduce
perceptions. We need a synthesis of reproduction in imagi-
nation (CPR, AlOO-AlOl, A121). If I try to "think of the
time from one noon to another," Kant tells us, and "if I were
always to drop out of thought the preceding representations
. . . [if I] did not reproduce them while advancing to those
14. Brackets in the original.
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that follow," then, he says, "not even the . . . most elemen-
tary representations . . . could arise" {CPR, A102). We must
be aware that what we think is the same as what we
thought a moment before {CPR, A103). Otherwise we would
have disjointed chaos. We would not be able to connect
earlier and later perceptions of an event or object—they
would not belong together for us. We would have no
"experience" of the event or object.
Still, even this is not enough. Representations, if they are
to give rise to knowledge, cannot be reproduced in any old
order just as they happen to come together accidentally.
The reproduction, Kant thinks, must conform to a rule
according to which a perception is connected with some one
representation rather than another {CPR, A121). The
concepts or categories of the understanding provide these
rules—rules for the necessary reproduction of the manifold
{CPR, A103, A106; also B233-A201). A third synthesis,
then, is necessary. A synthesis of recognition in a concept is
necessary to determine the specific order, relation, and
reproduction of representations. The only way to grasp
these succeeding and remembered moments in one cognition
and to unify these sensations into one object is through a
concept which embraces, organizes, and unifies them.
Without this concept we would not have an object, but
merely a disjointed series of isolated, remembered sensa-
tions. And without this conceptualization we would not
have a unified consciousness to grasp this unified object.
This threefold synthesis, it is clear, also requires a unity
of consciousness—Kant calls it the transcendental unity of
apperception {CPR, A106-A107). For Hume, there was no
fixed, stable, unified self that could be experienced. When
we turn to inner sense, we experience nothing but a fiux of
shifting and changing ideas, images, impressions, and
feelings.^ ^ Kant agrees with Hume that we never experience
a unified self (CPÄ, A106-A107). But for Kant there must be
a unified self, without which the diverse multitude of
sensations and the temporal fiux that constitutes inner
sense would not belong to a single consciousness and thus
could not belong to me. The fiux must be unified within a
single self for experience to be possible—or else this fiux of
15. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford-
Clarendon, 1967), 251-63.
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images would not be my flux of images. It would not be my
experience. There would then be no experience—but
"merely a blind play of representations, less even than a
dream" (CPR, A112, A122, B132-B133).
I want to argue that the first three chapters of Hegel's
Phenomenology follow and comment upon Kant's treatment
of the threefold synthesis of the imagination. At the same
time, they criticize Kant and try to get beyond his unknown
thing-in-itself. Chapter I, "Sense-Certainty," takes up
immediate sensation and treats it simply as apprehended,
that is, as if we had a synthesis of apprehension, the first
moment of the threefold synthesis, but without going any
further, without having a synthesis of reproduction or a
synthesis of recognition. We quickly see that this fails. We
cannot even hold impressions together through time. So in
Chapter II, "Perception," we go on to include a synthesis of
reproduction, the second moment of the threefold synthesis,
memory holding together a series of representations through
time. Here we get a thing and its properties—which recalls
the empiricism of John Locke. This runs into various
troubles because we have not as yet included a synthesis of
recognition in a concept. In Chapter III, "Force and the
Understanding," where we finally arrive at Kant's categories
or concepts of the understanding, we include the third part
of the threefold synthesis, and we come to see that we must
understand objects as conceptual relations.^^
In "Sense-Certainty," we start with simple, immediate,
and seemingly indubitable sensation, an as yet unorganized
manifold of isolated sensations. We certainly do not have
conceptually organized objects, but, as Hegel puts it, merely
a "This." We have a "Here" and a "Now"—a spatial "Here"
and a temporal "Now"—making up a "This." We point to it,
indicate it, mean it. We can say no more about it (PhS, 59-
60).
But even as we do so, we discover that we really have no
pure immediacy before us; we really have no "Here," or
16. For evidence that Hegel sees the importance of the Kantian threefold
synthesis, see Philosophy of Mind, trans. W. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971),
208-10. Also Faith and Knowledge, trans. Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany,
NY: SUNY P, 1977), 69-70. Also First Philosophy of Spirit, in System of Ethical
Life (180213) and First Philosophy of Spirit, ed. and trans. H. S. Harris and T. M.
Knox (Albany, NY: SUNY P, 1979), 219-21.
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"Now," or "This," but only instances of them. The "Here" and
the "Now" change. Night changes into day. As I turn my
head, the tree disappears and I see a house. The indicated
referent does not remain; it will not hold stable; it is not
preserved. If "Now" is night, Hegel says, let us write it
down, "a truth cannot lose anything by being written down,
any more than it can lose an)rthing through our preserving
it." But the next time we look, it is noon and our truth "has
become stale" {PhS, 59-60). The "Now" changes, is different,
has a different referent. We have ignored the role of time.
"This" will not indicate the same referent through time. The
"This" will not indicate the unity of an object through time.
We have ignored the synthesis of reproduction in imagina-
tion. We have ignored memory—^we forget {PhS, 64).
Hegel wants us to see that "Here," "Now," "This" really
refer to universals. No "This" will indicate a sensuous
particular. Any "This" can indicate any and all "Heres,"
"Nows," "Thises." Language can never say, can never
express in words, the sensuous particular that we mean
{PhS, 60). Hegel is headed in the same direction as Kant
here. We cannot have knowledge simply of isolated, given
sensations. Knowledge involves universals—it requires
concepts.
What we are driven to, for Hegel, is a "Now" of many
"Nows," a "Here" of many "Heres"—a plurality holding
together as a universal. We have a "Now" which is a
process, a passing of "Nows" in time {PhS, 64, 66). Time,
then, is an inescapable element of any sensation. And thus
a synthesis of reproduction is a necessary element of any
organized experience. The series of isolated sensations must
be held together, remembered, reproduced, through time.
In Chapter II, "Perception," we begin with what Sense-
Certainty drove us to—a "This" of many "Thises," a "Now" of
many "Nows." We have an entity that holds together—a
universal that holds together particular moments. To use
the language of empiricists, we have a thing of many
properties {PhS, 66-67). Empiricism, Hegel claims in the
Logic, elevates the brute facts of sensation to general ideas
{EL, 77). What Hegel means here, I think, is that we have
the idea of many sensations or qualities held together as a
thing; in other words, basically a Lockean substance—an
idea (signifying we know not what) holding together many
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properties." To use Kant's language, we have now included
t;he second moment of the threefold synthesis—a synthesis
of reproduction in imagination. We have a holding together,
a remembering, a reproducing, of sensations through time.
However, we do not yet have the third moment—a synthesis
of recognition in a concept. The Lockean idea of a substance
signifying we know not what falls short, we shall see, of
Kantian categories. Hegel, in Faith and Knowledge (78),
even claims that Kant's views are an extension of Locke's.
So Hegel takes up a suitable example, a bit of salt, a thing
that has several properties—it is white, tart, cubical. These
properties are taken to be separate, distinguishable, and
indifferent to each other as well as to the salt as a whole. As
Hegel puts it, they are connected by an indifferent
"Also"—the salt is white, also tart, also cubical. But at the
same time, these properties are all held together in a unity.
And so, besides these "Alsos," we have a "One" (PhS, 68-69).
How do we explain how these properties are unified in the
salt, are a "One," yet at the same time are "Alsos," are
separate, distinguishable (we can distinguish the color from
the taste, the taste from the shape, and so forth)? Where
Hegel is headed here is to show us that if the thing-property
model, the substance model, will not explain things, we will
have to move toward a doctrine of internal relations.
Let us try, as empiricism did, to attribute the separate-
ness to the subject. It is the subject's perception that
distinguishes the whiteness fi-om the tartness and from the
cubicalness; and the subject will also accept responsibility
for any distortion of the object brought about in this process.
We have Locke's notion of secondary qualities. The thing is
white only to our eyes, tart only to our tongue. Secondary
qualities (colors, sounds, tastes) exist only in the mind and
are not thought to resemble anything in the object (PhS, 70,
72, Locke, 134-35, 137). On the other hand, the unity we
will attribute to the thing or substance itself—to primary
qualities (solidity, extension, mobility, figure) that are
supposed to exist independently on their own in the thing
just as they appear to us.
The problem is that while we can attribute unity to the
thing or substance, we cannot, as George Berkeley pointed
17. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H.
Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 95,175, 295-97.
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out, perceive that unity. All we perceive are secondary
qualities, the "Alsos," the whiteness, the tartness. Primary
qualities cannot be perceived except through secondary
qualities—^we cannot, for example, identify shape without
color. And even the primary qualities are separable. So, we
never perceive the substance, the unity, the "salt itself," as
something beneath the whiteness, tartness, or cubicalness.
Hegel concludes, as did Berkeley, that we can simply
dispense with the substance. The thing itself is nothing but
the qualities—the whiteness, tartness, cubicalness (PhS,
At this point, we have completely reversed ourselves. We
can no longer say that the diversity, the separateness, is due
to the subject, and the unity to the object. We find no unity
in the object—it is nothing but a diversity, a separateness,
the "Alsos." We find that the subject has merely projected
a unity into the object (PhS, 73-74). The substance is merely
an idea we add to the distinguishable qualities. The unity
then is due to the subject and the diversity to the ob-
ject—precisely the opposite of what we started with.
Let us, then, try a different tack. Let us try making the
subject responsible for both sides—for the unity, the unify-
ing, of the object, and also for distinguishing the various
qualities or properties (PhS, 74). This is no longer a
Lockean substance but merely a Berkeleyan object of
perception. Hegel also has Kant in mind here (EL, 85-86).
The thing is merely what appears, what can be perceived,
and that is all. The thing is whiteness, tartness, cubical-
ness; the oneness is produced by our perception, the unity of
our consciousness, that holds it all together.
What we have then is a thing that presents itself as a
unity for-consciousness, but in-itself it is seen as diverse.
This raises big problems. The thing is taken both as
something in-itself and as something for-consciousness. And
the thing is something different for-consciousness from what
it is in-itself. It is a one for-consciousness and diverse in-
itself. We have a split object. Moreover, the thing is one (a
unity) only ior-another. The thing only gets its oneness for-
itself through another. So, to be one (unified) the thing must
18. George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, in The Works of
George Berkeley Bishop ofCloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: Nelson
and Sons, 1949), 2: 44-45.
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be other than itself, that is, to get its oneness it must not be
one—it must be something besides itself. It must also be
something for-consciousness, for-another {PhS, 74-76).
This is an insurmountable problem for empiricism. The
thing-property model or the substance model will not work.
It will not explain the thing's unity (oneness) that exists
only for-another (for-consciousness). The only way to
understand this is as a relation—a relation grasped by
concepts.
In "Force and the Understanding," we reach the third
moment of the threefold synthesis—the synthesis of recogni-
tion in a concept. However, the consciousness there on the
stage has not yet become aware of the transcendental unity
of apperception. Consciousness does not yet see that the
unity of the object is due to the unity of consciousness; that
is, consciousness does not yet see that, or does not yet see
the degree to which, consciousness constitutes the object.
We still have an understanding that sits back and observes
its object as if the object were just given to it from outside,
or as if the object were anchored in an unknown thing-in-
itself—a view that Hegel also wants to undermine as he
proceeds in this chapter. He wants to begin to move beyond
Kant.
The first question that arises, I suppose, is why Hegel
discusses force? Hegel moves from simple experience to
more complex experience and, at each stage, he chooses an
example appropriate to the point he wants to make. Here he
chooses force because it is a perfect example of a phenome-
non that is unexplainable on the substance model or the
thing-property model. It can only be understood as a
relation grasped by concepts.
What is force? Force appears, is expressed, when another
object approaches and attracts, repulses, or excites it. Think
of two magnets. There is no actual contact between the two
as there is with Hume's billiard balls. There is no connect-
ing or transmitting medium. The infiuence (the attraction
or repulsion) is not a mechanical operating on the other. It
makes no sense to speak of a thing or substance transmit-
ting motion as a property to another thing {PhS, 85). You
can only speak of interaction—relations—^within a field. In
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the Jena System of 1804-5 (49-51, 55), Hegel explicitly
claims that force is not a substance but a relation. ^ ^
Force is nothing but an interaction occurring in a field.
Force exists only if it is expressed. When the magnets come
close enough together, force appears. When they are far
enough apart, it disappears. Perception was unable to
reconcile being one for-another and being diverse in-itself
Force has not the slightest difficulty with this. What force
is in-itself, it is through its expression, through its relation
to another. It expresses itself only when the other magnet
approaches. Thus, only insofar as force is for-another is it
what it is in-itself Moreover, when force is expressed, it is
diverse; when it is driven back into itself, it is one (PhS, 80-
82, 86, JS, 54). Thus, it is one in-itself and diverse for-
another. Yet it is what it is in-itself (one) only through its
relation to another (diversity).
Force is a complex relation between the two magnets, not
a perceivable thing or substance or secret power. It is a
relation. Moreover, force is not an external relation. We do
not have two things or substances that can be related
externally as with Humean billiard balls. Force is
quintessentially an internal relation—and, I suggest, that is
what Hegel is after. The very essence of force is that it
exists solely through the other. Force cannot be what it is
except in its relation to another (PhS, 86, also 82, 100,
Hyppolite, 130, also 122). The other is part of its essence.
All we experience, then, is a play of forces. We see forces
appear and vanish—a flux of forces. That is all. To project
a substance behind this appearance explains nothing. What
understanding grasps, then, is only the relation, the appear-
ance, the flux. Nor does understanding grasp any inner
workings or mechanism. Nevertheless, Hegel suggests, we
yearn to project something behind the appearance. The
inner remains, in Humean or Kantian fashion, a mere
beyond (PhS, 86-88). What is this beyond? Consciousness
wants to call it (and Kant did call it) the thing-in-itself,
which does not appear—an unknown thing-in-itself.
Consciousness just assumes it must be there. Conscious-
ness wants it to be there, needs it there. Consciousness
19. Hegel, The Jena System, 1804-5, trans. John W. Burbidge and George di
Giovanni, with intro. and notes H. S. Harris (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1986)
49-51, 55 (hereafter JS).
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posits the inner as an explanation of the manifestation of
force. The inner explains the unity—the connection—of
forces. The appearance is pure fiux—interactions appearing
and disappearing. The inner is the unity that continues
through this fiux—a lawlike inner unity. Consciousness
takes this inner to be the in-itself, a supersensible world, the
true world; a beyond. Hegel says that this is the first dim
appearance of reason in the Phenomenology {PhS, 87-88).
He is obviously referring to Kant's ideas of reason—regula-
tive ideas that allow us to treat nature as if it were unified
and consistent. As we shall see, for Hegel as for Kant, there
is something like a transcendental illusion involved here,
though, for Hegel, in very much the opposite sense of Kant
{CPR, A297-B354, A314-B371, A644-B673, A653-B682,
A698=B726).
In both the Phenomenology and the Logic, Hegel suggests
that we are driven to go behind, within, to find a unity, a set
of laws, a lawlike explanation {EL, 53). Hegel calls it a
''Reich der Gesetze," a realm or kingdom of laws {PhS, 91).
For Kant the thing-in-itself was found not only behind any
given experience of particular things but, in the Transcen-
dental Dialectic, nature as a whole was also taken to be a
thing-in-itself. The unity of nature as a whole could never
be experienced but was assumed as a regulative idea. Hegel
wants to focus on the thing-in-itself not just behind particu-
lar things—a specific appearance-disappearance of force—
but much more importantly behind the unity of the whole of
physical nature. Understanding and natural science need a
concept of a unified nature. For science to be possible, for
the understanding to carry out its work, Kant thought, we
must assume that nature is unified and consistent {CPR,
A653-B682, A670-B701, A678=B706, A686=B715, A698=
B726). The same laws that explain terrestrial motion must
be consistent with the laws that explain planetary motion.
One set of laws must be subsumable under higher sets of
laws {PhS, 91).
Understanding demands this regulative idea, this king-
dom of laws. But, if we admit that consciousness needs,
assumes, projects this kingdom of laws, how can we say that
it is unknown? It is a need, a creation, a positing of the
understanding. The distinction between the fiux of appear-
ance and an inner world is a distinction made by conscious-
ness. To organize the fiux of appearance, understanding
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posits an inner world, a beyond, a unity, a kingdom of laws.
In doing this, consciousness takes itself to be talking about
a real, independent, inner world, actually there behind the
scenes. But we see that consciousness simply made a
distinction between appearances and an inner,
supersensible thing-in-itself. We see that the supersensible
beyond simply arises from the world of appearance and, as
Hegel puts it, that appearance is its essence and only filling
(PhS, 89).
Hegel will resist this drive of consciousness to project a
world beyond, a true world, an unknown thing-in-itself In
the Logic, Hegel says that the Absolute is not far away in a
world beyond. It is always directly before us. We always
carry it with us (£^ L, 59). We must just learn to see how. In
the Phenomenology, he says: "behind the so-called curtain
which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is
nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves, as much
in order that we may see, as that there may be something
behind there which can be seen" (PhS, 103).^ °
Hegel denies that the thing-in-itself is unknown. It is not
unknown because we construct it. There is nothing there
unless we ourselves go behind the curtain to construct it.
And what is it we construct? An inner, a beyond, an empty
abstraction. It looks like an unknown thing-in-itself because
it has no content to be known. But nothing is more easily
known—it is merely the empty concept of an other world, a
beyond, an unknown. It is merely an empty concept, whose
only filling or content comes fi-om appearance (EL, 87, PhS,
89).
At this point, Hegel says we have moved from conscious-
ness on to self-consciousness (PhS, 103) because we see that
the thing-in-itself, the inner, the kingdom of laws is con-
structed by consciousness. Self-consciousness grasps
appearances-for-consciousness as well as the thing-in-itself,
which we now see is just another kind of appearance-for-
consciousness. The content of self-consciousness is com-
pletely contained within consciousness. We have—though
the consciousness does not see all of this yet—a transcen-
dental unity of apperception. All objects lie within this
unified consciousness, and in opposition to Kant there is no
20. Italics in the text.
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unknown thing-in-itself The transcendental illusion
involved here is not what Kant thought it was. It is not that
we mistakenly claim to know the unknowable thing-in-itself
as we try to go beyond experience to know the whole of
nature, as we assume that nature is unified and consistent,
a kingdom of laws. The transcendental illusion is rather
that, in going behind the curtain, in constructing the thing-
in-itself, the beyond, the kingdom of laws, we do not notice
that in fact we ourselves do this constructing and that
nothing is more easily known than the thing constructed.
Let us take stock and see where we are. If we construct
the unity of nature, as Hegel argues in his discussion of the
kingdom of laws and as even Kant would admit in his
discussion of regulative ideas, and if, for Hegel, we also
thereby construct the thing-in-itself which is thus known,
then we cannot say that what we construct is mere appear-
ance cut off from an unknown thing-in-itself We must
concede that we construct the unity of nature as reality.
This, then, immediately poses a problem regarding the
subject. The individual Kantian subject cannot construct
the unity of nature as reality. Reality constructed by
individual subjects would lead to a subjectivist chaos. We
must begin, then, to understand the subject differently, to
get beyond a Kantian individual subject, and on toward an
absolute subject.
Hegel takes the rest of the Phenomenology to complete his
proof of the Absolute, and it is impossible to follow him here.
But perhaps the following can help. For Kant, we have
ordered experience. If we can state the necessary conditions
or presuppositions for our having this ordered experience,
we can give a deduction of those presuppositions. For Kant
what is presupposed is the operation of the categories of the
understanding. For Hegel, categories or concepts of a much
more complex sort are necessary for ordered experience to be
possible. But we also note that for Hegel consciousness
must be responsible for the constitution of a great deal more
order in experience than was the case for Kant. We cannot
account for this order merely as order in Kantian phenome-
nal appearance. To construct reality, we must account for
the order found in reality. Consciousness is responsible for
all order in nature, culture, history, and the religious
sphere. There is no other possible source for that order.
What sorts of presuppositions must we make to explain this
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enormous range of order? This should begin to make it
clearer why we cannot get along with less than the Absolute.
The whole of experienced reality is ordered. How did it
become so? Individual consciousness might be able to order
its own subjective experience understood as Kantian
appearance, but not all of reality. Nothing short of the
Absolute is going to be able to explain the totality of this
order.
For Kant, the categories of the understanding constitute
experience, but only local experience. Everjrthing that can
appear to us must appear to us as ordered by the categories.
But what appears to us are only bits of nature. Nature as a
whole never appears to us. And so while any bit of nature
that appears to us will be unified by the categories of the
understanding, the categories cannot unify nature as a
whole. To think they can would be to think that the catego-
ries can be applied beyond experience to the thing-in-itself.
Nevertheless, for Kant, it is necessary to assume that nature
as a whole is unified. The very possibility of natural science,
to say nothing of ordinary experience, depends upon it. We
must assume that the laws of nature which hold in one part
of nature are not arbitrarily suspended but also hold in the
rest of nature that we have not experienced. We assume
nature to be consistent. Laws of nature cannot contradict
each other. Science as well as ordinary experience would
fiounder. For Kant, therefore, we must think of nature as if
it were designed by a divine intelligence. We cannot know
this. It is not given by the categories. We cannot apply the
categories to the whole of nature, to the thing-in-itself. But
we must take the unity and consistency of nature as a
regulative idea {CPR, A644=B672, A653-B682, A670-B699,
A672-B701, A677-B707, A686-B715).
One can almost hear Hegel chuckling in the background.
Kant's move is perfectly transparent. Individual conscious-
ness constructs the unity in nature. It just insists that the
thing-in-itself remains unknown so it can get away with
holding this unity to be a mere regulative idea, mere
appearance, not reality. But if the thing-in-itself is our
construction just as much as the regulative idea, then, for
Hegel, we must face up to the fact that there is only one
possible source of all the order we find in nature, and that is
us. And if we cannot get away with claiming that what we
order is mere appearance because we cannot pretend that
614 The Structure and Method of Hegel's Phenomenology
the thing-in-itself remains unknown, if we must admit that
we order reality, then we must also go on to admit that we
cannot order it as individual consciousnesses, but only as
participating in absolute consciousness. If that is the only
way to explain the order of nature, if all other attempts fail,
then we must accept the Absolute.
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